An Unnecessary Judicial Election

Abstract

In 2011, Bolivia became the first country in the world to conduct a process of selecting judicial authorities through universal suffrage. The etymology of “democracy” refers to the power of the people; however, in practice, state power often prevails over sovereign will. The administration of justice does not require the acquiescence of citizens; in many cases, justice must adopt decisions that are unpopular. Under the Montesquieuan model, a dynamic and balanced system of checks and balances is intended, whereby power is controlled by power. In this context, the Legislative Branch conducted the entire selection process through a special law, which raised substantive and procedural concerns. This process was conducted in a haphazard manner, describing normative, technological, economic, sociological, and even psychological deficiencies. Among the irregularities observed, the emergence of the phenomenon of self-extension by authorities beyond their constitutionally mandated terms stands out. The issue is described as a phenomenon within the framework of economic law, wherein a democratic principle operates with certain peculiarities, aiming to outline the concept of judicial welfare.