Election of Judges to the Highest Courts by Popular Vote

Abstract

The 2009 Bolivian Constitution established the popular election of the country’s highest judicial authorities with the stated aim of depoliticizing their appointment and placing it under citizen control. However, this article demonstrates that the adopted model contains structural contradictions that have undermined both its effectiveness and legitimacy. Through constitutional, normative, and empirical analysis of the judicial elections held in 2011, 2017, and 2024, the study shows that the current system has perpetuated—and even intensified—judicial politicization, as the Legislative Assembly retains full control over the pre-selection of candidates, reducing citizen participation to a merely ratifying role. Furthermore, the prohibition of electoral campaigning and the limited dissemination of candidates’ qualifications prevent voters from making informed decisions, resulting in high rates of null and blank votes and growing public distrust. The article argues that popular elections are incompatible with the strictly legal and technical role of judges. Based on this critique, it proposes a constitutional reform toward a mixed or hybrid model involving professional associations, judicial bodies, and other independent institutions in the appointment process, aiming to depoliticize the system and restore judicial independence. The research concludes that the current electoral model is not only dysfunctional but also erodes public trust in the judiciary and must be urgently replaced.